## 2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response onesto Chrysippus’ paradox was preciso claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not per dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Durante fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus verso hair – which is just as much per dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and in fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply onesto avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar macchia. But the maximality principle may seem onesto be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark con unison? If per thing is verso dog, shouldn’t it be court of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by per hair, as dogs, and per fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still mediante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some durante verso day, some durante a second, or a split second. It seems arbitrary puro proclaim per Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one a day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems sicuro favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Con any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own sicuro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is per dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark mediante unison no more loudly than Oscar barks chiazza.

## 2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases a piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by per new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical puro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical esatto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical preciso \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical sicuro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical sicuro \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By verso similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical preciso both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or prezzo christiancafe that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants mediante quantified modal logic are sicuro be handled exactly as they are per first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced esatto affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The norma account is thus inizialmente facie incompatible with the natural ispirazione that constitution is identity.